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Abstract 
Previous experimental work has found that Positive Confirmation is a significant factor in 
learning. However, to date, there has been no attempt to test this phenomenon in a game- 
theoretic setting. An experiment is undertaken which tests positive confirmation in a game 
against nature. It is found that positive confirmation does occur in this setting and results in 
behaviour that cannot be explained by current theories of choice. This suggests that current 
theories are incomplete and new approaches need to be developed to take account of 
positive confirmation. 
 
Keywords: Positive Confirmation; Game against Nature; learning 
JEL No.: D81        
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       During the last few years, tests of learning in game theory have become a growth 
industry in experimental economics. Most of these experiments have taken the form of 
subjects playing each other in repeated games and fitting different models to the generated 
data. This has produced many useful results and an increasing fit of models to the data (see 
Camerer (2003)). There are, however, many potential improvements that could be made to 
current models and theories.  It will be argued in this paper that one fruitful direction would 
be to take insights on learning from the psychology literature and try to incorporate them 
into experimental tests of learning in game theory. 
  The aim of this paper is to test for the existence of positive confirmation in a tightly 
controlled series of games. Positive Confirmation is the tendency, when testing a belief, to 
search for and use evidence that is implied by that belief rather than evidence that is not 
implied by it1. To date, there have been two experimental studies made of this bias in the 
economics literature (Jones & Sugden 2001, Jones 2003) although there is a large literature 
on positive confirmation in the psychology literature (e.g. McKenzie 2004; Manktelow & 
Over 1993; Oaksford & Chater 1994; Cheng & Holyoak 1989, Wason 1960). The two 
experiments in the economics literature have focussed on positive confirmation as a cause 
of bias from expected utility when making decisions. 
    From these two experiments three conclusions were derived. First, positive 
confirmation exists and it causes a bias from expected utility maximisation when choosing 
information. Second, this bias occurs both in cases where the information has informative 
value but is non- expected utility maximising and also where the information is completely 
valueless. In the latter case, positive confirming choices of valueless information were 
shown to happen even when they incurred a cost for the subject. Finally it was shown that, 
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as well as positive confirmation in the selection of information, there is also positive 
confirmation in the use of information. This means that where information is interpreted as 
confirming a belief, this increases subjects' confidence in the truth of the belief and their 
tendency to act on it. This occurs even if, from a Bayesian point of view, that information 
has no value2.  
      In this paper it is proposed to give a test of the existence of positive confirmation in 
a game theoretic setting rather than in the specialised environments of the previous 
experiments. We are interested in whether subjects exhibit Positive Confirming behaviour 
which is not predicted by Bayesian learning theory within this setting.  Bayesianism has 
been selected as the control in the experiment because it is a standard of rationality and also 
allows for a test of more complicated structures than is allowed by the rigid formats of 
other learning theories. The experiment therefore is not constructed to test other theories 
such as fictitious play (Fudenburg and Levine 1998), reinforcement learning (Borgers and 
Sarin 1997) and Experience- Weighted Attraction (Camerer & Ho 1999). However there 
will be an interest in how people behave when they fall short of Bayesian rationality and 
what this means for theorising about learning.  
 To a certain extent this has already been done in that previous experiments have 
shown that subjects will tend to use information that is valueless. In that such information 
is ignored in the structure of game theory and by learning theories this already demonstrates 
the incompleteness of learning ideas in game theory. However, the aim here is to 
demonstrate an effect of positive confirmation in a game theoretic setting that is not 
accounted for by Bayesianism or bounded rationality even when all available information 
has value. 
 4
  There is no well-specified theory of positive confirmation as there is for 
Bayesianism and the myopic learning theories so the experiment will not test a specific 
model against the data3. Instead the experiment will involve a test of the mechanisms of 
Bayesianism to see whether these mechanisms fully explain the results of the experiment. 
This means that the experiment will only involve a few repetitions of the game used. This 
focus on the individual stages of the game means that there is no attempt to look at the 
effects of large numbers of repetitions or asymptotic results. These are not at issue in this 
paper and are not analyzed. 
     The implications of previous work on positive confirmation for game theory would 
seem to be fairly straightforward. If a strategy chosen by an individual is “successful” (i.e. 
it gets good feedback/ payoffs) then it will be more likely to be chosen again by that person. 
However this is problematic because there are several potential confounding factors which 
are partly the result of the testing method used. We have not got a quantitative model to 
comparatively test with other models so instead we have to rely on the directions of 
strategy choices made by the subjects. Given the qualitative focus of the experiment, these 
confounding factors become inevitable. The problem is that positive confirmation in this 
context is hard to distinguish observationally from Bayesian updating and expected utility 
maximization without controls on the type of behaviour allowed or not allowed within the 
experiment. 
  One such problem comes from the payoffs. If in a game there is a comparatively 
higher payoff as a result of a subject using a strategy, this will increase the likelihood of 
that strategy being used again.  This could either be the result of subjects maximising utility 
or Positive Confirmation on a “successful” strategy. Therefore, with differing payoffs, the 
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strategy with the highest payoff would always be chosen and Positive Confirmation would 
not be qualitatively distinguishable from Bayesianism or other theories. 
    Another potential confounding factor is the influence of the opposing subject. If a 
subject updates in a Bayesian format then the opposing subject’s play history is used to 
form a distribution over strategies. This is in turn used to formulate a best reply by 
maximizing expected utility. If one strategy is consistently a best reply to the opponent’s 
play then this will observationally look like Positive Confirmation. This is because the 
“best reply” is a successful strategy that will be chosen again and again by the subject. 
Again, this means that it is hard to distinguish between Bayesian updating and Positive 
Confirmation simply using the direction of choices. 
    Any successful experimental test of positive confirmation will have to take these 
confounding factors into account and control or test for them. Furthermore, any such 
experiment should be comparable with previous experiments in allowing for tests of 
positive confirmation. In particular, it should also allow us to distinguish between positive 
confirmation in the search for and use of information.  
The first element of this controlled experiment is to have subjects play a repeated 
game against nature. This effectively removes the effects of playing against another subject 
and makes the distribution of strategies played by the opposing side (i.e. “nature”) 
stationary. Furthermore, the experimenter can have far greater control over the prior 
probabilities and information given to the subjects as well as being able to follow in far 
greater detail the updating processes of the subjects4.   
           The second element is to split apart the choosing of evidence and the selection of 
strategies. This allows a distinction to be made between positive confirmation in the choice 
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of evidence and in the use of evidence. This means that playing a strategy does not provide 
information as feedback on it is not provided until the end of the experiment. Instead the 
subjects receive information through items of evidence known as combinations. These 
combinations give information to the subjects about the strategies played by nature and so 
give the subject expected values for choosing each strategy.  Combinations generally give 
information about several strategies at once. 
      This split effectively excludes a direct test of most of the “myopic” learning theories as 
these assume that strategies are updated when they are played whereas here playing the 
strategy is different from gaining information about it. This is something that is intrinsic to 
the experiment. However, this split also opens up the possibility of testing a plausible, 
alternative “bounded rationality” explanation of behaviour in the experiment. This, briefly, 
is the idea that a subject only focuses on updating one strategy at a time and ignores 
evidence for other strategies. 
 This needs to be tested because such a boundedly rational subject would be a 
problem when testing for Positive Confirmation. If such subjects find this one strategy 
“successful” then they will continue to use this strategy in a manner which would be 
identical to that of a Positive Confirmer. However, this would be the result of reinforcing a 
strategy while ignoring evidence for other strategies. This behaviour is not the same as 
positive confirmation where evidence, once obtained, is not usually ignored (although it 
may be misused). The tactic used in this experiment will be to assume that all available 
information is used but to test to see whether subjects are instead boundedly rational in 
focussing on the information for one strategy at a time. 
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    This split between searching for and using evidence, while it causes complications, 
is crucial in that it allows for “backwards compatibility” with previous experiments which 
have tested for positive confirmation. This in turn means that there is more room for 
comparison and replication of results across experiments. Also, in maintaining the 
distinction between positive confirmation in searching for evidence (i.e. choosing 
combinations) and positive confirmation in the use of evidence  (i.e. choosing strategies), it 
allows for an investigation of the links and differences between the two. 
     The third element in the experiment is to make this game against nature, at each 
stage, a pure strategic form matching game with equal expected payoffs. This is done by 
making the prior probabilities of each of nature’s strategies equal and having the payoffs 
for correctly matching nature’s strategy the same over all possible strategies. When the 
probabilities are updated in an objective Bayesian fashion then they eliminate precisely half 
of the strategies at every round. This means that the Bayesian probability of the eliminated 
strategies is zero while the positive probabilities are equally loaded onto the remaining 
strategies. The result of this is that the expected payoff at each stage of the game for the 
surviving strategies is equal. 
These three elements together mean that at each stage of the game the subject has a 
choice between a set of equally weighted strategies. This naturally leaves the problem of 
what to choose where one is indifferent between all available strategies. In such a situation 
we will follow Harsanyi and Selten’s (1988) notion of symmetry invariance. Informally this 
states that if strategies are identical save for their labelling or ordering then they should be 
chosen with equal probability. So, in this case, given that each strategy is equally likely to 
be chosen by nature and that successful matching results in the same payoff irrespective of 
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strategy, this means that each subject’s strategy should be equally likely to be chosen. It 
follows that any deviation from this will be a good indicator for the effect of positive 
confirmation. 
              
2. Experimental Design 
  
         The subjects in the experiment5 were presented with a set of sixteen rules of which 
one was selected at random as the hidden rule. This random selection of a rule acted the 
role of “nature” in the game. The objective for the subjects was to find out which rule was 
the “hidden” rule. This was done by testing evidence presented in rounds of evidence and 
then choosing one of the rules. Each round of evidence consisted of a choice between two 
pairs of combinations of symbols which allowed the subject to increase her knowledge of 
the hidden rule. At the start and finish of the experiment, as well as in between the rounds 
of evidence, the subject was asked a question; in each case to state which rule she thought 
was the hidden rule. There were five questions interleaved with four rounds of evidence. 
   These questions can be seen as the subjects’ play in the game against nature. The 
subject matched with nature when they answered a question by stating the hidden rule. The 
selection of combinations allowed the subjects to increase their knowledge of this rule so 
that each stage game involved matching with Nature over a smaller set of possible 
strategies. 
     The rules selected were related to symbols, each of  which had four major attributes 
relating to their: a) Shape,  b) Colour, c) Size, d) Possession of a border. Denote each 
attribute by ℵi where subscript i is an index to which attribute is being referred.  In each 
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case there were two possibilities or aspects for each attribute (e.g. the shape could either be 
a cross or an octagon. For a full list of rules see Appendix A). An aspect xi of attribute ℵi 
will be referred to as either αi or βi so that xi ∈ {αi , βi}. Each rule was a simple declarative 
statement and related to a layout where there were two such symbols; one denoted the Left 
Symbol and the other the Right Symbol .Together this pair of symbols comprised a 
combination. Rules were declarations that an aspect xi did or did not hold for one or other 
of these symbols.  
  Denote the set of rules as R. The hidden rule was picked out at random without the 
knowledge of the subject so the probability of any one rule being picked out was one- 
sixteenth. Denote this hidden rule H∈R. It should be noted that the rules are symmetrical in 
the sense that there are equal chances of H being about either aspect in each attribute. It is 
also equally likely that H would be about either the left symbol or the right symbol. These 
facts were known to the subject. 
    In each round of evidence in the experiment the subject was presented with a choice 
of two combinations in order to test for the rule H. Each symbol in a combination had one 
aspect from each of the four attributes. Suppose X1 represents the collection of attributes 
for the left symbol and Y1 represents the collection of attributes for the right symbol, both 
in the first round of evidence. The right symbol was constructed so that it shared at least 
one and at most three attribute aspects with the left symbol so, if X1 = (α1, α2, α3, α4) then 
one possibility for the other symbol is Y1 = (α1, β2, β3, β4). (Another possibility would be 
(β1, α2, α3, β4)). 
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   The second combination offered in the round of evidence also had two symbols. 
However, in this case, the attribute aspects were inverted. Denote the corresponding left 
and right symbols for the second combination in the first round of evidence as X'1 and Y'1. 
In this case X'1 = (β1, β2, β3, β4) and Y'1 = (β1, α2, α3, α4). This symmetry between the two 
combinations was important in the construction of the experiment since it meant that each 
attribute aspect, for each symbol position, appears just once in each round of evidence. This 
corresponds with the fact that each aspect is mentioned in just one rule in R. Together X1 
and Y1 form the combination Z1 while X1' and Y1' form the combination Z'1 in the first 
round of evidence. 
     The evidence varied from round to round to enable the subject to acquire more 
information about the rule H. The general aim in the experiment was to have every symbol 
in the experiment vary in at least one attribute aspect from any other symbol. In order to 
maintain the symmetry between the four rounds of evidence it was decided that symbols in 
the same position and combination should have different aspects for two of the attributes 
from each other. So, if the attribute aspects for the first round of evidence were as above 
then, for the second round, one possibility would be: X2 = (α1, α2, β3, β4), Y2 = (α1, β2 ,α3 , 
α4), X'2 = (β1, β2, α3, α4), Y'2 = (β1, α2, β3, β4). This allowed for each round having the 
same informative content as all the other rounds which means that the rounds of evidence 
could be presented in any order.  
     Once the subject had chosen one of the two combinations then she was told 
whether that combination was allowed by the hidden rule H or not. A combination Zj 
(where j is the round of evidence) is said to be allowed by any rule R∈R if the attribute 
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aspect xi mentioned and indicated in the symbol by R, is identical with the attribute aspect 
in the symbol in Zj. If a combination is allowed or disallowed by H then this communicates 
information about H to the subjects 
             Incentives were distributed on the following basis. At the end of the experiment the 
rule H was revealed to the subject and then the rule was compared to the subject's answers 
to each of the five questions. A die was rolled by the experimenter and the number on the 
die used to select one of the five questions. If the answer to that question was correct then 
the subject won a money prize of £20. Otherwise they won nothing. If a six was rolled then 
the subject was given an automatic "win" of £20. 
 
 
4.  Hypotheses  
    In what follows we will have two separate definitions of Positive Confirmation. 
Positive Confirmation in the choice of evidence is when a subject chooses a combination 
which is allowed by the rule given by the subject in the preceding question. This is 
equivalent to the “positive confirmation in the search for evidence” mentioned above. 
Positive Confirmation in the choice of rule is when the subject, having Positively 
Confirmed in the choice of evidence and been told that the combination is allowed by the 
hidden rule, then goes on to repeat the same rule in the following question. This is 
equivalent to “positive confirmation in the use of evidence” as mentioned above 
     The experiment is structured so as to allow for the updating of probabilities in the 
following manner. Examination of the structure of the combinations shows that in each 
round of evidence half the rules are eliminated so that in the final questions there is only 
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one possible rule left.  It follows that in each question one can calculate the objective 
Bayesian probability of choosing the correct rule. Hence, the prior probability of any one 
rule being H is known at the start to be 1/16, after the first round of evidence for those rules 
not eliminated it is 1/8. In the third question it is 1/4, in the fourth 1/2 and, in the fifth 
question, the rule should be known. 
     A crucial problem which has to be assessed is how would a person choose amongst 
these equally- rewarding rules each time they have to make a choice? The basic solution 
has already been outlined above. One should assume, as a null hypothesis, that subjects are 
rational in the sense that they obey symmetry invariance and assign equal probabilities to 
each strategy. However, this is insufficient for this experiment since, as has been pointed 
out by Schelling (1960) as well as by Sugden (1995) and Bacharach (1993), it is possible 
for subjects, when faced with matching games, to rationally select a strategy by focussing 
on the labelling (or “concepts”) of the game. 
     This creates a problem of control in the experiment because it is possible that a person 
playing the game could choose a strategy based on the labels (called “aspects” here) rather 
than on positive confirmation. The answer to this is to follow Casajus’ (2000) notion of 
framed strategic forms. A frame strategic form is a strategic form game which includes the 
labelling of the game within its definition. This means that any solution to the game must 
take account of the labelling of the games. 
   The main concept of relevance here is Casjus’ extension of symmetry invariance to 
framed strategic forms. According to this a framed strategic form is symmetry invariant if it 
is symmetry invariant in strategies but also if there is an isomorphism into itself of the 
labels and attributes as well (Casajus 2000). This means that swapping the labels around 
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between two strategies will not have any effect on the choice between the two. Again, this 
implies that symmetric strategies are assigned equal probabilities. 
   An examination of the rules in this experiment will show that the design of the 
experiment is highly symmetric in this sense. There is no bias towards either symbol in 
each combination, there are equal numbers of rules covering each attribute (i.e. four each 
for colour, size, shape and border) while there are two aspects for each attribute. This 
means that there is no label (aspect) which is distinguished by different numbers of rules 
and so they are symmetrical and hence symmetric invariant.   
          It follows that one would expect rule choices to be randomly distributed amongst the 
possible rules with the expected numbers choosing each rule being roughly equal. From 
this, the principal null hypothesis in this experiment is that subjects choose rules at each 
stage of the game randomly, in line with the Bayesian probability of a particular rule being 
the hidden rule. Define the set Ra⊂R as the set of rules in question “a” which have not been 
eliminated by objective Bayesian updating in the previous rounds of evidence. Suppose 
ψa(.) is a function defined from the set Ra to the interval  [0,1] where subscript "a" is an 
index of the question. This can be defined as a decision probability over the set of rules Ra . 
Suppose that Ri ∈Ra is a rule that has been chosen by a given subject in the previous 
question. In the questions for a = 2,3,46 then ψa(Ri) =  1/8, 1/4, 1/2 for Ri ∈ Ra  (assuming 
that Ri is not eliminated at any stage). The alternative hypothesis in this case would be that 
of Positive Confirmation i.e. that ψa (Ri) > 1/8, 1/4, 1/2  for Ri ∈ Ra as a = 2,3,4.  
     As it stands this null hypothesis does not strictly test Positive Confirmation in the 
choice of rules as it simply tests for significant amounts of repetition of rules. However, as 
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we mentioned previously, Positive Confirmation is used in a far more sophisticated way 
than this. Any reasonable test should only include those who are positive confirmers in 
their choice of evidence and whose selected combination is allowed by the hidden rule. The 
results for this hypothesis therefore will focus on this subsection of the sample   
     The secondary null hypothesis relates to Positive Confirmation in the choice of 
evidence. Here we will also derive our null hypothesis from Casajus’ extension of 
symmetry invariance. For this the choice of evidence is important to the subject in that it 
gives information which is valuable in choosing which strategy to pick. In fact each 
combination in each round will eliminate precisely half of the rules on offer so they can be 
seen as being equally valuable and so symmetrically invariant in the sense of Harsanyi and 
Selten. 
     However, as was laid out in the second section in this paper, the combinations in each 
round of evidence are counterbalanced with each other in terms of attributes so that neither 
combination stands out against each other. The effects of this counter- balancing can be 
seen in Table 1. From this it can be seen that Casajus’ extension of symmetric invariance 
applies here as well so that, in each round of evidence, a combination should be equally 
likely to be chosen. It follows that any systematic divergence from this will not be the result 
of the labelling of the combinations. 
Suppose we define a function π(.) as a decision probability defined from the set {Zb,Zb'} of 
combinations to the interval [0,1]. π (Zb) or π (Zb') are the probabilities that a subject 
chooses combination Zb or Zb' in the bth round of evidence when attempting to find rule H.  
Suppose also that the combination Zb is allowed by the rule chosen in the previous 
 15
question. In this case the null hypothesis would be  π (Zb) = π (Zb') where b=1,2,3,4 . The 
alternative hypothesis is that of Positive Confirmation in the choice of evidence. In this 
case one would expect that a positive confirmer would tend to choose combination Zb over 
combination Zb'. It follows that the alternative hypothesis in this case  would be  π (Zb) > π 
(Zb') where b=1,2,3,4. 
    One problem inherent in this experiment is the fact that it requires some effort at 
calculation (although not an implausible amount) and so subjects may make choices of 
rules which are not consistent with the information received7. “Consistency” in this case 
will simply refer to choosing rules which have not yet been eliminated by the evidence. As 
an example, after the first round of evidence there will be eight rules out of the original 
sixteen which would be eliminated by the chosen combination. If,  in the second question, a 
subject chooses one of these eight rules then they are being inconsistent. Otherwise they are 
consistent. 
   This notion of consistency allows us to formulate a test of whether the subjects are 
Positive Confirming or are boundedly rational subjects who are focussing on the 
information for one strategy at a time. The first fact to notice is that these one- strategy 
subjects would not have any information about the likelihoods of rules apart from the one 
they had been focussing on. So, for example, it would be plausible for a subject to have the 
rule that she chose rejected by a combination and then choose another rule which has 
(logically) been rejected by previous combinations but has not been focussed on by the 
subject. The second fact to notice is that combinations in subsequent rounds of evidence 
may not again reject a rule that has been logically rejected by a previous combination. 
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   From these two facts one can see that, if a person was simply focussing on 
information for one rule at a time, then the choices of rule may indeed look like Positive 
Confirmation in that one would see repetitions of successful rules. However, these 
repetitions of rules would not be guided by whether the subjects were being consistent or 
not as they would not be able (by assumption) to keep track of their own consistency. The 
repetition of rules by subjects would, therefore, be independent of the consistency of the 
subject. 
  It follows that a significant difference from independence would indicate that the 
subjects would not simply be focussing on information for one rule at a time. A bias 
towards inconsistency would suggest that positive confirmation would tie in with 
irrationality and that consistent subjects would not tend to be Positive Confirmers. By 
contrast, if there was a bias towards consistency then this would tie in with previous results 
that showed Positive Confirmation to be a “reasonable” tactic to use (See Jones & Sugden 
2001). 
 
4. Experimental Design: Details 
 
    The experiment was carried out at the University of Dundee in the year 2002. 
Subjects were recruited by e-mail on campus and came from a wide range of course 
programmes across all years. The 87 subjects took part in groups of up to 12 at a time. 
   The experiment was carried out using a questionnaire and followed the general structure 
in section 3. Before starting the main experiment, subjects were given full instructions 
about the nature of the tasks involved, how questions and rounds of evidence were to be 
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answered and how the random lottery device worked. These instructions were given orally 
with some visual aids that illustrated the workings of the experiment. This was followed by 
an example of two questions with a round of evidence in between- although using different 
symbols for the combinations and a different set of rules from those used in the experiment 
itself. Subjects worked through this example with the help of further oral instructions. In 
composing the instructions care was taken not to suggest that there was a right way to do 
the task or to suggest that any strategy was preferable to any other. 
     After this each subject answered two multiple-choice questions which were 
designed to test understanding of the task and scoring system. In the first question they 
were tested on whether they understood the meaning of the idea that a combination was 
allowed by a rule. In the second question the subject was asked to imagine that they had 
completed the experiment and had successfully stated the correct rule three times. They 
were then asked what chance they would have of getting the money prize of £20. In 
general, the answers to these test questions indicated a high level of understanding with  the 
overwhelming majority getting both answers correct.  
    There were four rounds of evidence in the experiment, each of which consisted of a 
choice between two combinations. Which round of evidence appeared in which order in the 
experiment was randomly varied so as to prevent order effects. Table 1 gives the base 
rounds before the order was randomised. In table 1 column 1 gives the round of evidence 
while column 2 gives the combination of symbols to be chosen in each round. For a given 
round of evidence, Columns 3 and 4 give the attributes of each symbol in each 
combination. Examination of these attributes will reveal that they correspond with the 
framework set out in section 2. 
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    The experiment proceeded as follows. The subjects were given all possible rules in 
the experiment on a sheet of paper, together with their main questionnaire. Each of these 
rules was also was written on a separate piece of paper and placed in an envelope. These 
sixteen envelopes were then shuffled and one was dealt out for each person in the 
experiment. The subjects were told which their envelope was and that their task in the 
experiment was to discover which rule was in this envelope.  
    After the instructions the experiment started and the subjects went through each 
question and round of evidence simultaneously. First of all the first question was asked and 
subjects had to write down which rule they thought was in their envelope. Next they were 
faced with their first round of evidence. Subjects chose a combination from the two 
available by ticking the box next to the one they wished to choose. Once this had been done 
they were told to halt.  The experimenter went around the subjects with their envelopes and 
told them whether the combination they had chosen was allowed or not by the rule in their 
envelope. The subjects were then given a chance to record this. After this the subjects went 
on to the second question and then the second round of evidence and this was repeated 
through the remaining questions and rounds of evidence. After the fifth question the 
experiment finished. The experimenters then went around each of the subjects and rolled a 
die to determine whether the subject had won any money and the money was then paid to 
the subjects. 
    
5. Results  
Table 2 gives an initial analysis of the sample, concentrating on the questions and 
whether they were answered in a manner that corresponds to Bayesian reasoning. This 
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gives an overview of the level of Bayesian rationality in the sample. There are two ways of 
measuring this. One is through looking at the proportions who answered the question 
correctly (i.e. matched with nature). The second column gives the expected (Bayesian) 
proportions of correct answers for each question while the third column gives the actual 
numbers of correct answers. Using the binomial test one can see that, up to the third time of 
asking the question there is no significant deviation from the expected proportion. 
However, after this point there are significant differences between expectation and the 
numbers answering correctly. 
    The second way of measuring the Bayesian rationality of subjects is to look at the 
consistency of choices, which are given in the fourth column. This column gives the 
number of consistent choices for each question. For the first question there has been no 
evidence received so all responses are consistent. After that it can be seen that consistency 
is initially quite high but drops sharply until by the fourth question the majority (just) are 
inconsistent. In the fifth question there is a slight revival, suggesting that the subjects made 
a special effort for the final question. This drop in consistency suggests that there was an 
accumulation of mistakes that diminished the number of correct answers in the later stages. 
   The main results are given in table 3 that shows the evidence for positive 
confirmation both in choice of evidence and in choice of rules. The first column gives the 
numbers of the rounds of evidence and the corresponding question numbers on either side 
of the round of evidence. Round 1, for example, is that between the first and the second 
questions. The second column gives the total numbers of subjects who chose combinations 
that were allowed by the rule which they had chosen in the previous question. As can be 
seen the numbers here show overwhelming evidence of positive confirmation in the choice 
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of evidence in all rounds and a violation of symmetry invariance in both strategies and 
labelling. 
   One important question is how closely linked are Positive Confirmation in the 
choice of evidence and the repetition of rules if combinations are allowed by the hidden 
rule8. Since it is assumed that the latter will only occur if the combination chosen is 
allowed by the hidden rule then the test sample is restricted to those cases.  The compariso
takes the form of a χ2 statistic on a cross tabulation of the occurrence of Positive 
Confirmation in the choice of evidence and rule repetition.  In general (apart from rou
there is a positive significant relationship between the two. It is not certain why th
relationship in round 3, although it is possible that the lack of consistency in question 4 
may have caused the relationship to break down. 
n 
nd 3) 
ere is no 
     One interesting result not reported in the table is the behaviour of those Positive 
Confirmers in the choice of evidence when a combination was not allowed by the hidden 
rule. In general, very few subjects then went on to repeat the rule from the previous 
question in the next question (2 subjects in round 1 and 1 subject in each of rounds 2,3 and 
4). This suggests that, when faced with disconfirming evidence, positive confirmers did 
tend to use it properly and reject the rule being tested.  
    The fourth column acts as a guide for the next four columns and simply states 
whether the same rule is repeated in the question before as in the question after the round of 
evidence i.e. whether there is positive confirmation in the choice of rules.  In columns 4 to 
7 the sample is cut back to include only those who were positive confirmers in their choice 
of evidence and whose chosen combination was allowed by the hidden rule. 
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 Column six gives the total numbers of consistent and inconsistent subjects while 
column seven only looks at those who were consistent. Column five gives the test 
proportions for columns six and seven. As mentioned earlier, these are based on the idea 
that, once a subject has updated their beliefs in light of the evidence, they will assign equal 
probabilities to the rules in line with symmetry invariance.  In column six we can see that 
this means that for rounds 1 and 2 there are significantly higher numbers of people who 
positive confirm than one would expect from the test proportions. It can also be seen that 
there are substantial numbers who Positively Confirm in the fourth round. However, round 
3 seems to be anomalous in that the number of Positive Confirmers in rule choice is 
significantly lower than the expected proportion. 
    However, it will be argued that this anomaly is an artefact of the lack of 
consistency of a large part of the population. This fits in with previous evidence that 
suggests that Positive Confirmation is a heuristic used by largely consistent (if not fully 
rational) people. If we look at column seven where all inconsistent subjects have been 
eliminated from the sample we can see that in all rounds  the proportion of Positive 
Confirmers has substantially increased. In round 3 the proportions are roughly as expected 
implying that high levels of inconsistency influenced the anomalous negative result. 
Looking at the other rounds we see that there are also significant numbers of Positive 
Confirmers in the first two rounds. In the fourth round the restriction to consistent subjects 
is associated with a large increase in the proportion who positively confirm. 
     The eighth column tests for the independence of Positive Confirmation in the 
choice of rules from consistency. As explained earlier, this not only explains the interaction 
in the preceding paragraph but also tests for Positive Confirmation against bounded 
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rationality in focussing on one rule. It will be seen that for the second, third and fourth 
rounds there are significant deviations from independence, suggesting that the Positive 
Confirming behaviour is not the result of bounded rationality based on information for just 
one strategy. This also confirms the interaction observed in the previous columns. 
 
 
 6. Discussion 
  The aim of this paper was to test for the existence of the Positive Confirmation bias 
in a controlled game- theoretic setting. This allowed for a test of Positive Confirmation by 
demonstrating systematic behaviour that was not explained by Bayesian updating. It was 
decided that the best way to test for this was through a controlled test of the mechanisms of 
learning using a game against nature with highly symmetric payoffs, updating and 
evidence. In addition, the game was adapted so that Positive Confirmation in the search for 
evidence could be tested separately from Positive Confirmation in the choice of rules. 
 It was found that Positive Confirmation exists in both cases. When subjects were 
searching for evidence this was particularly convincing as there was overwhelming 
evidence for this phenomenon as against the extended notion of symmetry invariance. 
There was also strong evidence for Positive Confirmation in the choice of rules although 
this has to be qualified by the failure of one round of evidence to demonstrate this effect. It 
was also discovered that subjects who Positively Confirmed in the choice of evidence were 
more likely to Positively Confirm in the choice of rules indicating that there is a link 
between the two. 
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   In general, the results of this paper do seem to corroborate previous experiments on 
the subject. It was found, as before, that Positive Confirmation exists and that it is not just 
the result of a lack of understanding by the subjects. Updating with Positive Confirmation 
strategies is carried out in a logical manner with a consistent pattern of reasoning. Being 
told whether a combination is allowed or not by the hidden rule does have an effect on the 
choices made. It is rare for a rejected rule to be repeated.   
     One striking and novel aspect of this is the role of consistency in whether subjects 
Positively Confirmed or not. It may be thought that subjects who were less consistent 
would be more likely to Positively Confirm. However this is not the case. Instead those 
who were consistent were more likely to Positively Confirm than those who were not. In 
fact it was the high level of inconsistency in round 3 that made sure that Positive 
Confirmation in the choice of rules was statistically significant in the wrong direction. It 
was also this fact that identifies Positive Confirmation behaviour as distinct from 
boundedly rational behaviour that focuses on information for one strategy at a time. 
    This also adds something to the question of why people Positively Confirm. It 
seems that, in many respects, Positive Confirmers have much in common with Bayesian 
updaters (although they have been shown to violate expected utility in some 
circumstances). This would help to explain why Bayesianism as a more effective method of 
updating does not replace it. People Positively Confirm because, quite often, it does lead to 
the right answer although it can also lead to subjects making suboptimal decisions. Positive 
Confirmation however is not obviously wrong and to subjects, in a world prone to random 
shocks, any failure of Positive Confirmation to achieve the correct answer may not result in 
its abandonment but may instead be attributed to other causes. 
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The success of this experiment lies in showing that Positive Confirmation is a 
systematic effect demonstrated by subjects in a game against nature. It also raises questions 
about other theories of learning such as fictitious play, reinforcement learning and 
experience-weighted attraction. By construction the myopic theories of learning cannot 
account for the results here as they only apply to situations where one just gathers 
information from the strategy one has chosen. However, even if we were in the latter 
situation, these theories do not adequately model Positive Confirmation in the choice of 
strategies. It follows that the next task will be to create and test a full- scale model of 
Positive Confirmation against the current myopic theories of learning to test for their 
empirical adequacy.
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                                        Appendix 1: Rules in the Experiment                                     
 
1) Left symbol is black  
2) Right symbol is black   
3) Left symbol is white  
4) Right symbol is white 
5) Left symbol is large 
6) Right symbol is large 
7) Left symbol is small 
8) Right symbol is small  
9) Left symbol is a cross 
10) Right symbol is an cross 
11) Left symbol is an octagon  
12) Right symbol is an octagon 
13) Left symbol has a border 
14) Right symbol has a border 
15) Left symbol does not have a border 
16) Right symbol does not have a border 
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                           Appendix 2- A Round of Evidence 
 
During this part of the experiment we ask you to test one of the two combinations below.  
 
Tick one of the two boxes on the right to indicate which combination you would like to 
test: 
                                       
Combination 1:  
 
 
 
                 
 
 
 
 
Combination 2: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Now please wait for the experimenter to tell you whether the combination you have chosen 
is allowed by the rule in the envelope 
 
The combination chosen is  (allowed/ is not allowed) by the rule in the envelope. (Delete as 
appropriate) 
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                                       Tables 
 
 
Table 1: Attributes used in Symbols in the experiment 
 
Round of 
Evidence 
Combination Left Symbol Right Symbol 
1 Cross, Large, Black, No Border Octagon, Large, White, 
Border 
1 
2 Octagon, Small, White, Border Cross, Small, Black, No 
Border 
1 Cross, Small, Black, Border Octagon, Small, White No 
Border 
2 
2 Octagon, Large, White, No 
Border 
Cross, Large, Black, Border 
1 Octagon, Large, Black, Border Cross, Large, White, No 
Border 
3 
2 Cross, Small, White, No Border Octagon, Small, Black, 
Border 
1 Octagon, Small, Black, No 
Border 
Octagon, Large, Black, No 
Border 
4 
2 Cross, Large, White, Border 
 
Cross, Small, White, Border 
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Table 2 - Numbers of correct answers and consistency for each question 
Question Test Proportion Total (87) Consistency 
1 0.0625 6 N/A 
2 0.125 16 77 
3 0.25 18 57 
4 0.5 22a 43 
5 N/A 46 46 
    aSignificant at the 5% level of significance 
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Table 3 –Positive Confirmation in the use of evidence and in choosing rules    
Round 
(Questions) 
Total PC 
Evidence 
PC Evid v 
Repetition 
Same 
Rule? 
Test Prop/ 
Consistent 
Total  
Allowed 
Consistent 
Allowed 
Consistent 
vs PC Rule 
Yes 13a 13a 1 
(1,2) 
73 5.973a 
No 
0.125 
23 19 
2.543 
Yes 13a 12a 2 
(2,3) 
66 13.72a 
No 
0.25 
22 12 
5.407a 
Yes 10a 8 3 
(3,4) 
64 3.459 
No 
0.5 
24 9 
5.1a 
Yes 22 17 4 
(4,5) 
65 32.29a 
No 
N/A 
12 4 
6.348a 
a Significant at the 5% level of significance 
 33
                                                          
 
1 Positive Confirmation should be distinguished from the confirmatory bias of Rabin & Schrag (1999) as well 
as Cognitive Dissonance (Festinger 1957). Positive Confirmation is a bias in the search for data while the 
latter two are concerned with how the data is changed either by an innate information processing bias or by 
one's own preferences.  
 
2 All of this casts doubt on the interpretation by Fischoff and Beyth- Marom (1983), Oaksford and Chater 
(1994) and McKenzie (2004) (amongst others) that much of positive confirmation can be explained by 
Bayesian updating. 
3 Unlike what is done in many of the experiments covered in Camerer (2003). A quantitative model would 
also involve extra assumptions which would be jointly tested with positive confirmation and so reduce the 
effectiveness of the test. 
4 In principle, using games against nature should have no effect on “unsophisticated” Bayesian updating or 
indeed most myopic learning theories used in the literature (evolutionary and social learning models aside) as 
these theories do not take into account the opposing subject’s payoffs or beliefs. 
5   The design (although not the interpretation) of the experiment is similar to the rule discovery task put 
forward by Levine (1966). The two are similar in many ways although it has been changed considerably to 
allow for controls in the form of incentives and prior probabilities. 
 
6 Note that a=1 is not included as there is no prospect of testing positive confirmation in the first question 
while a =5 is nonsensical in terms of the alternative hypothesis. 
7 It may be suggested that such inconsistency could be eliminated by repetition. However this is not followed 
here as there are potentially useful linkages between consistency and positive confirmation. Another reason 
concerns doubts about the efficacy of repetition. As Harrison and Rutstrom (2001) point out there may be 
different heuristics at work in one shot as opposed to those in repeated games. 
8 This is not the same as Positive Confirmation in the choice of rule. The latter assumes the combination 
selected is selected through Positive Confirmation in the choice of evidence. 
